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Abstract. To test the joint hypothesis that players in a noncooperative game
(allowing mixed strategies) maximize expected utilities and select a Nash equi-
librium, it suffices to study the reaction of the revealed collective choice upon
changes in the space of strategies available to the players. The joint hypothe-
sis is supported if the revealed choices satisfy an extended version of Richter’s
congruence axiom together with a contraction-expansion axiom that models
the noncooperative behavior. In addition, we provide sufficient and necessary
conditions for a binary relation to have an independent ordering extension, and
for individual choices over lotteries to be rationalizable.
Keywords and Phrases: independence condition, binary extensions, ratio-
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1 Introduction
A recent track of research seeks to identify the testable restrictions of various theories of
multi-agent decision making. Along these lines we set up a test to verify whether players
are expected utility maximizers and select a Nash equilibrium. Let us start the exposition
with an example.
Consider a noncooperative game between two players. Each player has two pure strategies:
U(p) and D(own) for player 1, L(eft) and R(ight) for player 2. We do allow for mixed
strategies. The strategy space for each player is the set
∆ = {(x1, x2) | 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1 and x1 + x2 = 1} ⊂ R2,
with x1 the probability the player attaches to his first mentioned pure strategy (U for
player 1, and L for player 2). Assume that player 2 is constrained to select strategy L with
a probability between 0 and 0.35, and that player 1 can freely choose in the set ∆. Given
this choice set, we observe that player 1 selects (0.4, 0.6) while player 2 selects (0.3, 0.7).
Similar experiments generate the following data:
available strategies 7−→ selected strategies
S = ∆× {(x1, 1− x1) | 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 0.35} (0.4, 0.6)× (0.3, 0.7),
S′ = ∆× {(x1, 1− x1) | 0.4 ≤ x1 ≤ 0.45} (0.4, 0.6)× (0.42, 0.58),
S′′ = ∆× {(0.5, 0.5)} (0.5, 0.5)× (0.5, 0.5).
Table 1: observed data.
The following question pops up. Given such a data set, is it possible to check whether or
not these players behave rational in the sense that they are expected utility maximizers
and select a Nash equilibrium? In section 4 we return to this example and we will argue
that the above data are not Nash rationalizable. The remaining part of this introduction
positions this research in the literature and introduces our main results.
Many theories on behavior start from assumptions on the individual preference relations
over the feasible set (e.g. transitivity, completeness). As soon as one accepts that binary
relations are not observable while actual choices are observable; it is important to test
whether the actual choices support or reject the assumptions. This issue has been discussed
by, among others, Arrow (1959), Richter (1966), and Sen (1971).
There are at least two ways to tackle this problem. One approach (Sen, 1971) studies how
the selection reacts upon particular changes in the set of feasible alternatives. Obviously,
if the individual consults a transitive and complete preference relation, then he should not
reconsider his selection when the choice set shrinks while his selected alternative remains
feasible. Analogously, when he selects the same alternative from two different choice sets,
then he should select again this alternative from the union of these two choice sets. As
such, the hypothesis of rational behavior becomes testable. A second approach is offered
through the theory of revealed preferences. If an alternative is chosen from a set, then
it is top ranked according to the revealed preferences in this choice set. The transitive
2
closure of this revealed preference relation is called the indirect revealed preference relation.
Richter’s (1966) congruence axiom provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice
correspondence to be rationalizable: if an alternative a is indirectly revealed preferred to
b, then b should not be strictly revealed preferred to a.
Sprumont (2000) extends the problem of rationalizability to situations involving different
and interacting individuals. He defines a joint choice function to be Nash rationalizable
if there exists a profile of complete and transitive preference relations over the sets of
actions, so that the observed outcomes coincide with the Nash equilibria based upon these
preferences. In the spirit of Sen’s approach, he characterizes Nash rationalizability through
the combination of an expansion and a contraction property. Ray and Zhou (2001) perform
a similar study for subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
We extend one of the results of Sprumont (2000) and tackle the Nash rationalizability of
collective choice when individuals have mixed strategies at their disposal. We maintain the
assumption that mixed strategies are observable. Table 1, for example, might result from
an experiment. Following the tradition in game theory, we interpret the rational behavior
of a player in terms of expected utility maximization. In particular, besides completeness
and transitivity we impose an independency demand upon the preference relations of the
(rational) players. This independency condition states that the relationships between two
lotteries are not affected when they are mixed in the very same way with a third lottery.
Myerson (1997, p11) discusses the strength of the independency axiom in the expected
utility maximization theorem. In addition, he indicates some of the difficulties that arise
in decision theory when independency is dropped.
Furthermore, in contrast to Sprumont (2000), we follow the track of revealed preferences.
Where in the original setup it is sufficient to check the ‘transitive’ closure of the revealed
preference relation, the present setting is more demanding. We modify Richter’s axiom and
require that the ‘transitive and independent’ closure of the revealed preference relation does
not conflict with the strict revealed preference relation. Besides that, we need an axiom
that connects the individual behavior to the collective behavior. We assume that a strategy
profile belongs to the collective choice if each player keeps his selected strategy when he is
assured that he is the only player allowed to deviate away. We refer to this condition as
the collective choice being noncooperative. Later on, we will argue that this condition has
some flavor of an expansion-contraction axiom. Our main result reads (see Theorem 3 in
Section 4 for the exact formulation):
Theorem. A collective choice correspondence is Nash rationalizable if and only if it is
noncooperative and satisfies the modified version of Richter’s congruence axiom.
Let us highlight two intermediate results towards this theorem. First, we need a condition
that is strong enough to guarantee that a binary relation extends to a transitive and
independent relation. Here, we learn from Suzumura (1976), who showed that consistency
is a sufficient and necessary condition for a relation to have an ordering extension. We shift
3
Suzumura’s result to a setup involving choices over lotteries, and we use the term ‘lottery-
consistency’ as a reference. Second, we study the behavior of a single individual choosing
from a set of lotteries (or mixed strategies). Here, we show that the extended version of
Richter’s congruence axiom –restricted to one player– is sufficient and necessary for the
individual choice function to be rationalizable.1 Then, we broaden the setup from one
individual to a finite number of interacting players. We apply the axiom of noncooperative
behavior and conclude the above theorem.
This theorem can be used in an experimental setting to test whether players are expected
utility maximizers and select a Nash equilibrium. In order to focus on the hypothesis that
players select a Nash equilibrium, one can proceed in two steps. In a first experiment, the
players are screened according to whether they are expected utility maximizers or not. This
can be done, for instance, through some Allais-paradox test (e.g. Conlisk, 1989; MacDonald
and Wall, 1989; and Oliver, 2003). This step filters out those individuals who violate the
expected utility criterion. In the second step, one confronts the remaining players with
a noncooperative game. As such, one can judge on the basis of observations whether in
mixed strategies the Nash criterion is rejected or supported.
The next section introduces the notation and studies binary relations and their independent
and transitive extensions. Section 3 introduces the concept of lottery-consistency as a test
for the rational behavior of an individual choosing over lotteries. Section 4 extends the
notation to collective choice and proves the main result. We return to the data in Table
1, and we briefly discuss the problem of observing mixed strategies. Section 5 closes the
paper. Here, we link our result to the analysis of Sprumont (2000).
2 Independent ordering extensions
This section establishes the notation, introduces the concept of independency of a binary
relation, and provides conditions for a relation to have an independent ordering extension.
Let H ⊂ Rn be the hyperplane of n-vectors the coordinates of which add up to 1, and let
∆ = ∆n ⊂ H be the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex. An element x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) in ∆
is an n-tuple of nonnegative real numbers adding up to 1, and is called a lottery. The ith
coordinate xi of the lottery x gives the probability that state i occurs.
Throughout, the set D refers to either ∆ or H. A binary relation R in the set D is a subset
of the cartesian product D ×D. The symmetric component R ∩R−1 is denoted by I, the
asymmetric part R \ I by P , and the non-comparable part D ×D \ (R ∪R−1) by N . For
the binary relation R′ we denote these induced relations by I ′, P ′, N ′; for R∗ we use I∗,
P ∗, N∗; etc. A reflexive and transitive relation is said to be a quasi-ordering. A complete
quasi-ordering is said to be an ordering. The binary relation R′ in D extends the relation
1This result is similar to Theorem 3.1 of Kim (1996). See Section 3 for a discussion.
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R if R ⊂ R′ and P ⊂ P ′.2
Next, we introduce the notion of independency. This condition studies the behavior of
a binary relation on compound vectors. For x and y in H and for α a nonnegative real
number, the vector [α, x, y] denotes the linear combination αx+(1−α)y. For α in between
0 and 1, the compound vector [α, x, y] is a convex combination of x and y. And, for α > 1
the compound vector is a point on the ray starting in y and going through x and does not
belong to the closed interval [x, y].
A relation R in D is said to be independent if for each couple in R the composition with a
third vector in D preserves the initial relationships. Formally, R is independent if for each
x, y, and z in D, we have
if (x, y) ∈ R, α ≥ 0, [α, x, z] ∈ D, and [α, y, z] ∈ D; then ([α, x, z], [α, y, z]) ∈ R. (1)
This condition implies the reflexivity of R (put α = 0). Observe that α is allowed to take
values larger than 1. As a consequence of this, an independent relation satisfies the ‘strict’
version of condition (1):
if (x, y) ∈ P, α > 0, [α, x, z] ∈ D, and [α, y, z] ∈ D; then ([α, x, z], [α, y, z]) ∈ P.
Indeed, the opposite conclusion “([α, y, z], [α, x, z]) ∈ R” implies
(y, x) =
([
1
α
, [α, y, z], z
]
,
[
1
α
, [α, x, z], z
])
∈ R,
and results in the contradiction (y, x) ∈ R and (x, y) ∈ P . Note that α and 1/α simulta-
neously occur (one of these values is larger than 1).
In case R happens to be a complete binary relation, a similar argument implies that R is
independent if and only if R is reflexive and for each x, y, z in D, and each α, 0 < α ≤ 1,
we have
if (x, y) ∈ R (resp. P ), then ([α, x, z], [α, y, z]) ∈ R (resp. P ). (2)
Obviously, condition (1) entails condition (2). Let us check that (2) implies (1). Suppose
the antecedent clause of (1) holds, and let α > 1. Then, the opposite conclusion –in the
assumption that R is complete– reads: “( [α, y, z], [α, x, z] ) ∈ P”. Again, we obtain a
contradiction: (y, x) ∈ P while (x, y) ∈ R.
Condition (2) only considers convex combinations and is therefore, in the present setting,
perhaps a more natural property.
There is an obvious relationship between the class of independent orderings on H and
the class of independent orderings on ∆. If R is an independent ordering on H, then its
restriction to ∆ is an independent ordering on ∆. The next lemma looks at the reverse
relationship.
2For two sets A and B, we write A ⊂ B if each element in A belongs to B. The combination A ⊂ B
and B ⊂ A is summarized as A = B.
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Lemma 1. An independent, transitive, and complete relation R in ∆, uniquely extends
to an independent, transitive, and complete relation R′ in H.
Proof. Let x and y belong to H. Let z ∈ ∆. Choose α > 0 sufficiently close to 1, such
that x′ = [α, x, z] and y′ = [α, y, z] belong to ∆. Let the ordering R′ on {x, y} agree with
the ordering R on {x′, y′}. The ordering R′ on {x, y} does not depend upon the choice of
z and α. We show this by contradiction. Let x′′ = [β, x, u] ∈ ∆ and y′′ = [β, y, u] ∈ ∆ and
assume that (x′, y′) ∈ R while (y′′, x′′) ∈ P . By independency, we have([
β
α+ β
, x′, y′′
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v1
,
[
β
α+ β
, y′, y′′
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v2
)
∈ R and
([
α
α+ β
, y′′, y′
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v3
,
[
α
α+ β
, x′′, y′
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v4
)
∈ P.
Observe that v2 and v3 coincide. Transitivity of R implies that (v1, v4) ∈ P . One can write
v1 and v4 in terms of x, y, z, and u and verify that v1 = v4. Hence, we obtain (v1, v1) ∈ P .
This contradicts the definition of the asymmetric component P of the relationR. Therefore,
R′ is well defined. Transitivity and independency of R′ follows from the definition of R′ in
combination with the transitivity and independency of R. 2
Now, we focus on conditions that are strong enough to guarantee that a binary relation
has an extension that is complete, transitive, and independent.
Let us insert here a result of Suzumura (1976, Thm 3) who solved a similar exercise.
Suzumura started from a relation R and looked for a complete and transitive relation
R∗ such that R ⊂ R∗ and P ⊂ P ∗. A natural way to proceed is to check whether the
transitive closure RT of R respects the asymmetric part, i.e. P ⊂ PT . Apparently, this
provides sufficient (and necessary) conditions: R has an ordering extension if and only if
for each x, y, we have (x, y) ∈ RT implies (y, x) /∈ P.
Suzumura labelled this condition as consistency.
We proceed similarly. Let R be a relation in D. The independent order relation R∗ in D is
said to be an independent ordering extension of R if R ⊂ R∗ and P ⊂ P ∗. The transitive
and independent closure RC of R is the smallest (for inclusion) relation in D that includes
R, satisfies transitivity and independency. The relation R is said to be lottery-consistent
if
for each x, y in D, we have (x, y) ∈ RC implies (y, x) /∈ P.
Before we shift the result of Suzumura towards the present setting, we provide some further
insight in the closure RC of a relation R in H.
Lemma 2. LetR be a relation inH. Then, (x, y) belongs to the transitive and independent
closure RC of R if and only if
• either, (x, y) belongs to the ‘transitive’ closure of R;
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• or, x − y = Σ`i=1βi(xi − yi), with (xi, yi) in R and βi > 0 for each i, and βj 6= 1 for
at least one j.
Proof. First, if (x, y) ∈ RC , then RC is able to rank x and y on the basis of a finite number
of couples in R. Let x and y be linked through the finite sequence x = x1, x2, . . . , xk+1 = y;
that is, the couples (x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . ., (xk, xk+1) belong to the independent closure of
R. Hence, there exist z1, z2, . . . , zk in H and α1, α2, . . . , αk > 0 such that
( [αi, xi, zi], [αi, xi+1, zi] ) ∈ R, with i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
For each i we obtain [αi, xi, zi]− [αi, xi+1, zi] = αi (xi− xi+1). Multiply these equations by
1/αi > 0, and add them up:
x− y = x1 − xk+1 = Σki=1
[αi, xi, zi]− [αi, xi+1, zi]
αi
.
In case α1 = α2 = . . . = αk = 1, then (x, y) belongs to the transitive closure of R.
Next, assume x − y = Σ`i=1βi(xi − yi) with (xi, yi) in R, βi > 0, and βj 6= 1. We have to
prove that (x, y) ∈ RC . We proceed by induction on `.
For ` = 1, it suffices to observe that the vector z = (x− β1x1)/(1− β1) in H allows us to
write x = [β1, x1, z] and y = [β1, y1, z].
Suppose the result holds up to `. Consider a positive linear combination of length ` + 1.
Assume that β1 6= 1. Consider (x′ − y′) = (1/β) × Σ`+1i=2 βi(xi − yi), with 0 < β 6= 1 such
that at least one of the coefficients βi/β differs from 1. From the induction basis, we obtain
(x′, y′) ∈ RC . Hence, we can write
x− y = β1(x1 − y1) + β(x′ − y′), with 0 < β1 6= 1, 0 < β 6= 1.
Let z and y˜ in H solve the equations x1 = [1/β1, x, z] and y1 = [1/β1, y˜, z]. Independency
implies (x, y˜) ∈ RC . Next, let z′ and y∗ in H solve the equations x′ = [1/β, y˜, z′] and
y′ = [1/β, y∗, z′]. Then, (y˜, y∗) ∈ RC . The transitivity of RC implies (x, y∗) ∈ RC . Finally,
the equations x1 − y1 = (x− y˜)/β1 and x′ − y′ = (y˜ − y∗)/β imply that y∗ = y. 2
Now, we can state and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. Let R be a relation in ∆. Then, R has an independent ordering extension if
and only if R is lottery-consistent.
Proof. Let R∗ be an independent ordering extension of R. Then, R ⊂ RC ⊂ R∗ and P ⊂
P ∗. Hence, it cannot happen that (x, y) ∈ RC and (y, x) ∈ P ; otherwise the combination
(x, y) ∈ R∗ and (y, x) ∈ P ∗ would occur. Conclude that R is lottery-consistent.
The proof of the reverse implication is more involved. Let R be a lottery-consistent relation
in ∆. Let the set Ω collect all the independent and transitive extensions of R. We will apply
Zorn’s lemma upon Ω and show that each maximal element in Ω has the right properties.
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First, we show that the closure RC belongs to Ω (hence, Ω is nonempty). The closure RC of
R certainly includes R and is independent and transitive. Let us check, by contradiction,
that P ⊂ PC . Therefore, assume that (y, x) ∈ P while (y, x) /∈ PC . This can only occur
if (x, y) ∈ IC . Conclude that (x, y) ∈ RC and (y, x) ∈ P . This conflicts with R being
lottery-consistent. Thus, we obtain RC ∈ Ω.
Next, consider a chain · · · ⊂ Rj ⊂ · · · ⊂ Rk ⊂ · · · in Ω; the index runs over some (possibly
infinite) set J . Let us verify that Rˆ = ∪j∈ JRj belongs to Ω. The relation Rˆ extends R,
i.e. R ⊂ Rˆ and P ⊂ Pˆ . Also, Rˆ satisfies independency and transitivity (otherwise there
exists a smallest relation Rj that violates independence or transitivity, and one ends up
with a contradiction). Conclude that the relation Rˆ in Ω is an upperbound for the chain.
Hence, each chain in Ω has an upperbound in Ω. Application of Zorn’s lemma results in
the existence of a maximal (for inclusion) element in Ω.
Let R∗ be a maximal element in Ω. As R∗ belongs to Ω, the relation R∗ extends R, is
independent and transitive. We still have to show that R∗ is complete.
We check, by contradiction, the completeness of R∗. Let (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ N∗. The relation Rˆ =
R∗∪{(xˆ, yˆ)} certainly includes R∗ (in the strict sense, Rˆ ⊃ R∗ and Rˆ 6= R∗). Furthermore,
the relation Rˆ extends R, i.e. R ⊂ Rˆ and P ⊂ Pˆ . The closure RˆC is independent and
transitive and includes R∗. The maximality of R∗ implies that the condition P ⊂ PˆC is
violated. Hence, there is a pair x and y in ∆ such that (y, x) ∈ P and (x, y) ∈ RˆC . Now,
consider the transitive and independent closure Rˆ′C of Rˆ in the hyperplane H (Lemma 1).
Application of Lemma 2 upon (x, y) ∈ RˆC ⊂ Rˆ′C results in
x− y = Σ`i=1 βi(xi − yi), with (xi, yi) ∈ Rˆ, and βi > 0.
As R∗ extends R and (y, x) ∈ P , the couple (xˆ, yˆ) must occur at the right hand side, say
(x1, y1) = (xˆ, yˆ). Furthermore, as R
∗ is independent the values β2, β3, . . . , β` are manipu-
lable. Conclude that the above equation can be solved for (xˆ, yˆ):
yˆ − xˆ = γ(y − x) + Σ`i=2 γi(xi − yi), with γ, γi > 0.
From Lemma 2 we learn that the pair xˆ, yˆ is comparable for the relation R∗ (extended to
H). This conflicts with (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ N∗. 2
3 Rationalizability of choice over lotteries
This section extends Richter’s result towards the rationalizability of individual choice over
lotteries. At the end of this section we shortly discuss a similar study by Kim (1996).
Consider the (n− 1)-dimensional simplex ∆ and let S be a collection of nonempty subsets
of ∆. A choice correspondence C is a correspondence
C : S −→→ ∆ : S 7−→ C(S) ⊂ S,
such that (at least) for each finite set S the choice set C(S) is nonempty. Hence, the class
of sets for which the choice correspondence is decisive certainly includes the class of finite
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sets. The choice correspondence C is said to be rationalizable if there exists an independent
ordering R∗ in ∆ such that for each S in S the set C(S) collects the maximizers of the
restriction of R∗ to S, i.e.
for each S ∈ S : C(S) = M(R∗|S) = {x ∈ S | for all y in S : (x, y) ∈ R∗} .
Observe that for a (rationalizable) choice correspondence the choice set C(S) might be
empty; e.g. if S ⊂ ∆ is an open (in the Euclidean topology) set and if the ordering R∗
happens to be continuous, then the set M(R∗|S) of maximizers might be empty. As it is
unclear what one should conclude on the basis of an empty choice set, we impose the choice
correspondence to be decisive on S, i.e. a set S for which C(S) = ∅ is excluded from S.
For a choice correspondence C : S → ∆, the revealed preference relations R˜ and p˜i in ∆
are defined as follows. The couple (x, y) belongs to the revealed preference relation R˜ if
and only if there is a set S in S such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S. Furthermore, the couple
(x, y) belongs to the strict revealed preference relation p˜i if and only if there is a set S in
S such that x ∈ C(S) while y ∈ S \ C(S).
We extend the congruence axiom of Richter (1966). A choice correspondence C : S → ∆
is said to satisfy the congruence axiom if and only if for each x and y in ∆ we have
(x, y) ∈ R˜C implies (y, x) /∈ p˜i,
where R˜C is the transitive and independent closure of the revealed preference relation R˜.
We will show that this congruence axiom is strong enough to guarantee the choice corre-
spondence to be rationalizable. The next lemma is a first step towards this result.
Lemma 3. If the choice correspondence C : S →→ ∆ satisfies the congruence axiom,
then the asymmetric part P˜ of the revealed preference relation R˜ coincides with the strict
revealed preference relation p˜i.
Proof. (i) : P˜ ⊂ p˜i. If (x, y) ∈ P˜ , then (x, y) ∈ R˜ and (y, x) /∈ R˜. Hence, there exists a
set S such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S; and for each set T containing x and y, it holds that
y /∈ C(T ). Put T = S and conclude that x ∈ C(S) while y ∈ S \ C(S), i.e. (x, y) ∈ p˜i.
(ii) : p˜i ⊂ P˜ . If (x, y) ∈ p˜i, then (x, y) ∈ R˜. In case also (y, x) ∈ R˜, the congruence axiom
is violated: (y, x) ∈ R˜ ⊂ R˜C and (x, y) ∈ p˜i. Therefore, (y, x) /∈ R˜ and (x, y) ∈ P˜ . 2
As a corollary we obtain that if a choice correspondence satisfies the congruence axiom,
then the revealed preference relation is lottery-consistent. The main result of this section
reads:
Theorem 2. Let the choice correspondence C : S → ∆ be decisive on S. Then, C is
rationalizable if and only if it satisfies the congruence axiom.
Proof. Let the independent ordering R∗ in ∆ rationalize the choice correspondence C.
Obviously, R∗ extends the revealed preference relation: R˜ ⊂ R∗ and p˜i ⊂ P ∗. As R∗ is
transitive and independent, R∗ includes the transitive and independent closure R˜C of R˜.
Suppose now that (y, x) ∈ p˜i. Then, (y, x) ∈ P ∗ and (x, y) /∈ R∗. As a consequence, if
(y, x) ∈ p˜i, then (x, y) /∈ R˜C .
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Let C satisfy the congruence axiom. By Lemma 3, the revealed preference relation is
lottery-consistent. Apply Theorem 1 and extend the revealed preference relation R˜ to an
independent ordering R∗ in ∆. Now, we have to verify whether C(S) = M(R∗|S) holds
each set S in S. Let x ∈ C(S). Hence, for each y in S we have (x, y) ∈ R˜ ⊂ R∗, i.e.
x ∈M(R∗|S). Next, let x ∈ S \C(S). By assumption, C is decisive on S: there exists a y
in S such that y ∈ C(S). It follows that (y, x) ∈ p˜i ⊂ P ∗. Conclude that x /∈M(R∗|S). 2
The ultimate goal is to establish a test for the null hypothesis
H0 : the individual choice correspondence C : S −→→ ∆ is rationalizable.
Of course, one can extract the binary relation behind the choice correspondence (by check-
ing all the pairs in ∆) and verify whether this relation is an independent ordering. In an
empirical setting, however, this is impossible to manage. Theorem 2 allows us to test on
the basis of a finite data set whether or not the null hypothesis should be rejected. As
usual, not rejecting H0 does not imply that H0 is shown to hold. The next section returns
to this issue.
We close this section by pointing out some differences with the work of Kim (1996), who
also studied the preference relation on lotteries revealed through a choice correspondence.
Although we both arrive at similar characterizations, we take different roads. Where Kim
(1996, Appendix) uses a generalization of the theorem of the alternative, we follow the
axiomatic approach and start from the theory of binary extensions. Furthermore, Kim
(1996, Thm 3.1) restricts the attention to finite choice sets. We do not impose restrictions
on the size of the choice set. However, recall from Theorem 2 that we need the choice
correspondence to be decisive on the choice sets.
4 Nash rationalizability of collective choice
Assume an experimental setting with individuals playing a game in mixed strategies. For
each individual, the experimenter (i) controls the set of pure strategies and the set of
possible mixtures as well, and (ii) observes the lotteries the individuals select. In case we
can extend the profile of revealed preferences to a profile of independent orderings such
that the selection corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, then we say that the observations
support the hypothesis of Nash rationalizable behavior. If the data reject this hypothesis,
then either some player does not consult a complete, transitive, and independent binary
relation, or the Nash equilibrium is not the right equilibrium concept. This section develops
such a test procedure.
We start by introducing some further notation. Let J = {1, 2, . . . ,m} be the set of players,
m ∈ N. Individual j has nj pure strategies, his strategy space ∆j is the (nj−1)-dimensional
simplex ∆nj . A strategy profile is a vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) with xj in ∆j the strategy
of player j. The cartesian product ∆ = ∆1×∆2×· · ·×∆m collects all the strategy profiles:
∆ =
{
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) |xj = (xj 1, xj 2, . . . , xj nj) ∈ ∆j
}
.
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In order to distinguish the strategy xj of player j from the strategies of his opponents,
we denote the strategy profile x also by (xj, x−j) with x−j = (x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xm)
collecting the strategies of j’s opponents.
A choice set S is a cartesian product S1 × S2 × · · · × Sm with Sj ⊂ ∆j and represents
an experiment, i.e. each player is confronted with restrictions on his strategy space. For a
choice set S, a strategy profile x in S, and a player j in J , we denote the cartesian product
Sj×{x−j} by Sxj . In the choice set Sxj the strategy space of player j is reduced to Sj while
the opponents only have one option (opponent i selects xi from his strategy space {xi}).
Let S be a collection of nonempty subsets of ∆. We assume that for each choice set S in
S, for each x in S, and for each j in J , the individual choice set Sxj also belongs to S. A
joint choice correspondence C is a correspondence
C : S −→→ ∆ : S 7−→ C(S) ⊂ S,
such that for each choice set of the form Sxj we have C(S
x
j ) 6= ∅. We refer to this assumption
as C is individually decisive. When the choice of all but one players is limited to only one
option, then we assume that this one player is able to select a strategy. Besides individual
decisiveness, we keep the assumption that C is decisive on finite choice sets.
In contrast to the previous section, we do not equip the players with a preference relation
on the set ∆ of strategy profiles. Instead, we assume that the players have preferences over
the probability distributions of pure strategy profiles (e.g. via the payoffs corresponding to
the pure strategies). As each player j has nj pure strategies, these pure strategies generate
n = n1 n2 · · · nm pure strategy profiles.3 The (n − 1)-dimensional simplex ∆n collects all
the distributions over these profiles. Let d denote the map that converts a strategy profile
in ∆ into a probability distribution in ∆n:
d : ∆ −→ ∆n : x 7−→ d(x), with di1,i2,...,im(x) = x1 i1 x2 i2 · · · xmim ,
where ij runs over the pure strategies 1 to nj of player j. Within this notation, we can
define Nash rationalizability of choice over lotteries.
Definition. Let the joint choice correspondence C : S → ∆ be individually decisive.
Then, C is said to be Nash rationalizable as soon there exists a profile (R∗1, R
∗
2, . . . , R
∗
m) of
independent orderings in ∆n such that for each S in S, we have
x ∈ C(S) if and only if d(x) ∈M(R∗j | d(Sxj )) for each j in J.
In words, a joint choice correspondence is Nash rationalizable if each player consults an
independent ordering to select his own strategy conditional upon his opponents’ strategies.
For a Nash rationalizable choice correspondence it holds that x ∈ C(Sxi ) if and only if
d(x) ∈M(R∗i | d(Sxi )). Hence, if C is Nash rationalizable, then x ∈ C(S) if and only if x ∈
3The example in the introduction exhibits four pure strategy profiles: (U,L), (U,R), (D,L), and (D,R).
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C(Sxi ) for each i in J . The noncooperative behavior of the players is clearly incorporated
in the definition of Nash rationalizability: a joint strategy is chosen if no single player has
an incentive to deviate away.
We modify the definitions of the revealed preference relations from the previous section
towards the present setting. Let a, b ∈ ∆n.
We start with the revealed preference relations R˜1, R˜2, . . . , R˜m. We have (a, b) ∈ R˜j if
there exist an S in S and x, y in S such that x ∈ C(Sxj ), y ∈ Sxj , and (a, b) = (d(x), d(y)).
Next, we consider the strict revealed preference relations p˜i1, p˜i2, . . . , p˜im. We have (a, b) ∈ p˜ij
if there exist an S in S and x, y in S such that x ∈ C(Sxj ), y ∈ Sxj \ C(Sxj ), and (a, b) =
(d(x), d(y)).
These definitions imply that a player is only able to reveal preferences conditional upon
a status quo of his opponents’ strategies. A player is able to select a above b only if he
has a and b at ‘his’ disposal, i.e. only if he is able to switch between a and b without the
cooperation of any other player.
Similar to the previous section, we search for conditions upon the revealed preferences to
guarantee the Nash rationalizability of a choice correspondence C : S → ∆. The joint
choice correspondence C is said to satisfy the congruence axiom if and only if for each a
and b in ∆n and for each j in J , we have
(a, b) ∈ R˜j C implies (b, a) /∈ p˜ij,
with R˜j C the transitive and independent closure of the revealed preference relation R˜j.
The next lemma states that if a joint choice correspondence satisfies the congruence axiom,
then the revealed preference relations are lottery-consistent. Its proof only involves minor
modifications of the proof of Lemma 3 and is omitted.
Lemma 4. Let the joint choice correspondence C : S → ∆ be individually decisive. If
C satisfies the congruence axiom, then for each player j the asymmetric part P˜j of the
revealed preference relation R˜j coincides with the strict revealed preference relation p˜ij.
At this point we are ready to provide conditions for the rationalizability of the individual
choice correspondences Sxj 7→ C(Sxj ). In order to obtain rationalizability of the joint
choice correspondence S →→ ∆, we need some ‘local-global’ condition to link the collective
choice from a set S with the individual choices from the sets Sxj . Here, we return to the
noncooperative nature of the Nash equilibrium. The correspondence C : S → ∆ is said
to be noncooperative if for each S in S we have
x ∈ C(S) if and only if x ∈ C(Sxj ) for each j in J.
In words, if a strategy profile x is selected from S then each player j selects this profile
when the choice set S contracts or shrinks into his individual choice set Sxj . And, if the
group of players jointly select x from the choice sets Sxj , then the group of players jointly
select x from the union S = Sx1 ∪ Sx2 ∪ . . . ∪ Sxm. As such, this axiom has some flavor of a
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contraction-expansion property. The combination of noncooperation and the congruence
axiom implies the rationalizability of the joint choice correspondence.
Theorem 3. Let the joint choice correspondence C : S → ∆ be individually decisive.
Then, C is Nash rationalizable if and only if C is noncooperative and satisfies the congru-
ence axiom.
Proof. Let C be Nash rationalizable through the profile (R∗1, R
∗
2, . . . , R
∗
m) of independent
orderings in ∆n. To prove that C satisfies the congruence axiom, one can apply Theorem
2 upon the individual choice correspondences C : Sj → ∆, where Sj collects all the choice
sets of the form Sxj with S running through the collection S. That C is noncooperative
has been argued above (see Definition).
Now, suppose that C is noncooperative and satisfies the congruence axiom. Then, each
revealed preference relation R˜j is lottery-consistent and extends to an independent ordering
R∗j in ∆
n (use Theorem 2). We have to check whether for each S in S, for each x in S, it
holds that
x ∈ C(S) if and only if d(x) ∈M(R∗j | d(Sxj )) for each j in J.
Let x ∈ C(S). As C is noncooperative, it follows that x ∈ C(Sxj ) for each j in J . Hence,
for each y in Sxj we have (d(x), d(y)) ∈ R˜j ⊂ R∗j . It follows that d(x) ∈M(R∗j |Sxj ) for each
j in J .
Finally, let x ∈ S \ C(S) and assume that d(x) ∈ d(S). As C is noncooperative, there
exists at least one player i for which x /∈ C(Sxi ). Since C is individually decisive, there
exists a y in Sxi such that y ∈ C(Sxi ). Therefore, (d(y), d(x)) ∈ p˜ii ⊂ P ∗i . It follows that for
player i we have d(x) /∈M(R∗i |d(Sxi )). 2
This theorem establishes a rule to judge whether or not the hypothesis
H0 : the collective choice correspondence C : S −→→ ∆ is Nash rationalizable
should be rejected. The test is exact in the sense that as soon as the observations conflict
with the axioms of noncooperation or of congruence, the null hypothesis is false with
certainty. The probability to reject the hypothesis when it is actually true is zero. Let us
apply the test upon the data (Table 1) presented in Section 1.
Denote x = C(S), x′ = C(S ′), and x′′ = C(S ′′). Let us list the four pure strategy profiles:
(U,L), (U,R), (D,L), and (D,R). We have that d(x) = (0.12, 0.28, 0.18, 0.42).
Use the axiom of noncooperation to conclude that player 1 reveals to (weakly) prefer
(0.4, 0.6) above any other strategy available to him, such as (0.3, 0.7). Let us write y =
(0.3, 0.7)×(0.3, 0.7), and d(y) = (0.09, 0.21, 0.21, 0.49). As such we learn that (d(x), d(y)) ∈
R˜1.
Similarly, d(x′) = (0.168, 0.232, 0.252, 0.348). Since also the strategy (0.42, 0.58) is at the
disposal of player 1, it follows (again, use the axiom of noncooperation) that (d(x′), d(y′)) ∈
R˜1, with d(y
′) = (0.2205, 0.3045, 0.1995, 0.2755) ∈ ∆4.
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Finally, d(x′′) = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25). The available strategy (0.2, 0.8) leads to the distri-
bution d(y′′) = (0.1, 0.1, 0.4, 0.4). The data imply (d(x′′), d(y′′)) ∈ p˜i1.
One can check that 2(d(x) − d(y)) + 4(d(x′) − d(y′)) + (d(x′′) − d(y′′)) = 0. Solve this
equation for d(y′′)− d(x′′) and conclude (use Lemma 2) that (d(y′′), d(x′′)) belongs to the
independent and transitive closure of R˜1. This contradicts our extended version of Richter’s
congruence axiom. Therefore, the data reject the hypothesis H0.
This exercise illuminates the need to observe the chosen distributions (d(x), d(x′), and
d(x′′) in ∆4) over the pure strategy profiles. Although the problem of observability of
mixed strategies is beyond the scope of this paper, we briefly discuss this issue. Hence, let
us assume that only pure strategies (randomly drawn from the selected distributions) are
observed.
One way to proceed, is to sufficiently often repeat the experiment and to perform the test
upon the estimated distributions. This approach, however, is at the cost of exactness: the
probability to reject a true hypothesis becomes strictly positive.
Alternatively, one can weaken the revealed preference relation. Suppose that the pure
strategy a is observed from a choice set S ⊂ ∆. This reveals the existence of a distribution
in S with a positive probability on a that is preferred to each distribution in S with zero
probability on a. Let Sa collect all the distributions in S the support of which contains a.
Then, this scenario reveals that the set Sa contains an element ranked above each element
in S \ Sa. One can look for conditions to rationalize such a choice correspondence. We
expect, however, that the resulting restrictions on the revealed preference relations will
turn out to be very weak.
5 Persistence axioms of Sprumont
In this section we show that the persistence conditions of Sprumont are equivalent to our
conditions for Nash rationalizability (when restricted to the setting of pure strategies).
As such we indicate that our Theorem 3 extends Theorem 2 of Sprumont (2000) to cases
involving mixed strategies (or choices over lotteries).
Let Aj be the set of pure strategies available to player j and let A = A1×A2×· · ·×Am be
the set of all joint pure strategies. When restricted to the pure strategies, the map d from
the space ∆ of strategy profiles to the space ∆n of distributions over the pure strategy
profiles becomes one-to-one. Observing a (degenerate) distribution in ∆n boils down to
observing the pure strategies selected by the players.
Let S be a collection of nonempty subsets of A and let C : S →→ A be a joint choice
correspondence (assumed to be decisive on S).
Then, C is said to be persistent under expansion if for each S and T in S it holds that
C(S) ∩ C(T ) ⊂ C(S ∨ T ), with S ∨ T the smallest choice set in S that includes S and T .
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Furthermore, C is said to be persistent under contraction if (i) for each S and T in S with
T ⊂ S it holds that C(S) ∩ T ⊂ C(T ) and (ii) for each S and T in S with T ⊂ Sxj and
C(Sxj ) ∩ T 6= ∅, it holds that C(T ) ⊂ C(Sxj ).
We express the equivalence as follows.
Proposition. Let C : S →→ A be a joint choice correspondence. Then, C is noncooperative
and satisfies the congruence axiom (taking only the transitive closure into account) if and
only if C is persistent under expansion and persistent under contraction.
Proof. First, assume C is noncooperative and satisfies the congruence axiom. Let us check
whether C is persistent under expansion. Let S and T in S. If a ∈ C(S)∩C(T ), then (use
noncooperation) a ∈ C(Saj )∩C(T aj ) for each j in J . Hence, the players reveal (a, b) ∈ R˜j for
each b in Saj ∪ T aj . If for player i in J we have a /∈ C ((S ∨ T )ai ), then this player reveals to
strictly prefer some action b (the decisiveness of C implies the existence of such an action)
over a, i.e. (b, a) ∈ p˜ii. This contradicts the congruence axiom. Hence, a ∈ C
(
(S ∨ T )aj
)
for each j in J . Noncooperation implies a ∈ C(S ∨ T ).
We now verify persistence under contraction. Condition (i). Let T ⊂ S and a ∈ C(S)∩T .
Noncooperation implies that each player j selects a from the individual choice set Saj .
The congruence axiom implies that each player j selects a from the smaller choice set T aj .
Conclude that a ∈ C(T ).
Contraction condition (ii). Let T ⊂ Sxj , b ∈ C(Sxj ) ∩ T , and a ∈ C(T ). As a consequence,
(a, b) ∈ R˜j. Hence, if this player does not select a from Sxj , there exists a d in Sxj such
that (d, a) ∈ p˜ij. As b ∈ C(Sxj ) and d ∈ Sxj , it follows that (b, d) ∈ R˜j. These observations
contradict the congruence axiom: (a, d) belongs to the transitive closure of R˜j, while
(d, a) ∈ p˜ij.
Next, suppose that C satisfies the persistence axioms. Let us check the congruence axiom.
Hence, assume (a, b) belongs to the transitive closure of R˜j with j in J . Denote the sequence
from a to b by a = a1, a2, . . . , ak+1 = b, i.e. we have (a1, a2), (a2, a3), . . . , (ak, ak+1) ∈ R˜j. As
player j is only able to reveal preferences conditional upon a status quo of his opponents,
it must be the case that a1, a2, . . . , ak+1 ∈ Aj × {a−j}, remember that a−j collects the
strategies of j’s opponents. Persistence under contraction (part i) allows us to focus on the
sets S` = {a1, a2, . . . , a`} with ` = 2, 3, . . . , k + 1. One can check that C(S`) ∩ S`−1 6= ∅.
From persistence under contraction (part ii) it follows that C(S`−1) ⊂ C(S`). Therefore,
a ∈ C(Sk+1), and a ∈ C({a, b}). Conclude that (b, a) /∈ p˜ij and (a, b) /∈ R˜j.
Finally, we check for noncooperation. Let x ∈ C(Sxj ) for each j in J . Persistence under
expansion implies x ∈ C(Sx1 ∨ Sx2 ∨ . . . ∨ Sxm) = C(S). And, if x ∈ C(S), then x ∈ C(Sxj )
for each j (use persistence under contraction). 2
Of course, this proposition mutually supports our results and those of Sprumont. Besides
that, it indicates that –when restricted to pure strategies– our Theorem 3 also extends
Theorem 2 of Sprumont to cases involving infinitely many pure strategies.
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